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Exceptions in Relational Plurals 
o. Introduction 
Sigrid Beck 
University of Connecticut 
This paper gives an account of unusually weak truth conditions in relational plural 
sentences and reciprocal sentences . The theory of exceptions developed in Brisson 
( 1 998) is extended to cumulative and weakly reciprocal interpretations. This 
strategy reduces the number of semantic readings we need to assume and allows us 
to capture the influence of context on such data. 
In section 1 I introduce the relational plural data that I am interested in and in 
section 2 the reciprocal data. I point out problems for the analyses currently 
available. Section 3 introduces my alternative proposal in terms of exceptions.  
1 .  Weak Truth Conditions for Relational Plurals 
A relational plural is a sentence like ( 1 )  (from Scha ( 1 984)) which contains two 
group denoting expressions (the squares and the circles) and something that 
expresses a relation between those groups (contain in the example) . The question is 
when we can say that a relation holds between two groups.  
( 1 )  The squares contain the circles. 
Scha ( 1984) observes that ( 1 )  is true in a situation like s 1  given in (2) . 
(2) s 1 :  
o 
o 
[Q] [Q] 
[Q] 
He suggests that the sentence is true just so long as each circle is contained in some 
square. This amounts to the truth conditions given in (3) .  
(3) 'v'y[y�C -> 3x[x� S & x contains y] 
(C stands for the group denoted by 'the circles', S for the denotation of 'the 
squares' and '�' is the part-of relation. Assume as a default that the relevant parts of 
a group are the individual members of that group, i .e .  the individual circles and 
squares. The examples to come will be formalized in an analogous way.)  
Scha accounts for this interpretation with the meaning postulate for contain 
given in (4) , which specifies what it means for the 'contain'-relation to hold 
between two groups . If one were to view this as a general interpretational 
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possibility for relational plurals, a relational plural sentence 'ARB' would have, on 
one reading, the truth conditions given in (5). 
(4) contain(A,B) iff \ty[y� -> :3x[x�A & x contains y] 
(5) ARB iff \ty[y�B -> :3x[x� & xRy] 
So, a group A stands in relation R to a group B just in case each member of B has a 
member of A standing in relation R to it. 
I think that we do not want to view this as a generally available reading of 
relational plurals because the truth conditions are too weak. This can be seen in two 
ways. First, let's change the situation and evaluate ( 1 )  against situation s2 given in 
(6). 
(6) s2: 
00 
o 
D D 
D 
It is at best unclear to me whether ( 1 )  is true in s2. If the interpretation were as in 
(3), I should have no such doubts . The situation is just an extreme case of the truth 
conditions in (3) .  Thus, it seems that it is too weak a requirement that only one 
square needs to be involved. 
Secondly, let's change the example slightly, and consider (7) .  
(7) a .  
b .  
The green jar and the purple jar contain the Earl Grey and the Assam. 
The three triangles contain the four circles. 
Imagine one of the jars is empty ; the sentence would intuitively be false. Similarly 
for (7b) . The intuitive truth conditions for (7a) are given in (8) . Each j ar contains 
one of the teas and each tea is contained in one of the jars.  
(8) \tx[x9 -> :3y[yg & x contains y] & \ty[y�T -> :3x[x9 & x contains y] 
This is a cumulative interpretation . Cumulative readings can generally be 
represented as in (9) . Compare (5) to (9) :  one direction of the cumultive 
interpretation is missing in the truth conditions suggested by Scha. 
(9) cumulation: 
ARB iff \tx[x� -> :3y[y� & xRy] & \ty[y� -> :3x[x�A & xRy] 
The observations regarding (6) and (7) versus ( 1 )  suggest a different perspective on 
why ( 1 )  may be judged true in s 1 .  Perhaps we are willing, under appropriate 
circumstances, to allow an exception to a cumulative interpretation. Then, the 
second direction of (9) would not really be missing. It's just that we tolerate an 
exceptional empty square. The conditions under which this is possible will have to 
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be clarified. I specify in ( 1 0) what would count as an exception to a cumulative 
reading.  
( 1 0) a .  
b .  
3x[x� & -3y[y�B & xRy] ] 
3y[y� & -3x[x�A & xRy] ] 
Exceptions are possible in two ways: there might be a member of group A that does 
not stand in relation R to any member of B (a non-containing square); or there 
might be a member of B that is not Red by any member of A (that would be an 
uncontained circle in the example) . We have seen an instance of a ( 1 0a) type 
exception. I will come back to ( 1 0) and to ( 1 )  vs.  (6) and (7) when we have a 
theory of exceptions. 
2. Weak Truth Conditions for Reciprocals 
First, let's look at the second set of data I want to discuss. These are reciprocal 
sentences such as ( 1 1 )  (from Dalrypmle et al . ( 1 998» . 
( 1 1 )  The pirates stared at each other. 
Dalrymple et al . ( 1 998) observe that the sentence is judged true in a situation like s3 
depicted in ( 1 2) .  The arrow symbolizes the relation 'stare at'. 
( 1 2) s3 : 
They propose that the sentence is true just so long as each pirate stared at one other 
pirate, i .e .  they propose the truth conditions in ( 1 3) .  
( 1 3) 'v'x[x� -> 3y[y� & x'*y & x stared at y]]  
Quite generally they suggest that reciprocal sentences can have the interpretation in 
( 14) ,  one-way weak reciprocity . A group A stands in relation R to each other iff 
each member of A stands in relation R to at least one other member. 
( 1 4) One way Weak Reciprocity (OWR): 
A R each other iff 'v'x[x�A -> 3y[y�A & x'*y & xRy]] 
Notice that this reciprocal interpretation is just like Scha's interpretation of the 
relational plural in terms of quantification over group members . I have similar 
complaints about OWR as I did about Scha's schema: the truth conditions we 
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assign seem, in general , too weak. In ( 1 5) I once more change the situation that we 
evaluate ( 1 1 )  against to the extreme case that would make ( 1 3) true: the pirates all 
stare at the same pirate. 
( 1 5) s4: 
4 
Just as in the case of 'the squares, it is at best unclear to me whether or not the 
sentence is true in this situation . And again, according to the truth conditions 
proposed for the sentence I should not have such doubts , the sentence should be 
judged true. It seems to be too weak to require that only one member of the pirate 
group needs to be stared at. 
Problems also arise if we change the example. Consider ( 1 6a) . 
( 1 6) a .  These three people want to marry each other. 
b .  
c .  
I judge the sentence false in situation ( 1 6b) because nobody wants to marry person 
1 .  The sentence would be true in the situation depicted in ( 1 6c) . The appropriate 
truth conditions seem to be the ones given in ( 17) :  each of the three people wants to 
marry another one of the three, and for each of the three people there is another one 
among them who wants to marry that person. 
( 1 7) 'v'x[x�3P -> 3y[y�3P & X"#y & x wants to marry y] & 
'v'y[y�3P -> 3x[x�3P & X"#y & x wants to marry y] 
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These truth conditions amount to a weakly reciprocal interpretation. The general 
case is given in ( 1 8) (cf. Langendoen ( 1 978)) :  we can say that A R each other iff 
each member of A stands in relation R to one other member of A, and also there is 
another member of A that stands in relation R to that individual. 
( 1 8) Weak Reciprocity: 
A R each other iff 
'v'x[x�A -> 3y[y�A & x'*y & xRy]] & 'v'y[y�A -> 3x[x� & x'*y & xRy]] 
Comparing WR to OWR, the second direction of WR is missing in OWR. But once 
more, our observations in this section suggest that perhaps the second direction is 
not really missing. Perhaps what happens in ( 1 1 )  is rather that, for some reason, 
we are willing to tolerate an exception to an interpretation that is basically weakly 
reciprocal (an un stared-at pirate) . I specify in ( 1 9) what it means to be an exception 
to a weakly reciprocal interpretation. 
( 1 9) a .  
b .  
3x[x�A & -3y[y�A & x'*y & xRy]] 
3y[y�A & -3x[x� & x'*y & xRy]] 
Either, you are a member of A that does not stand in relation R to any other member 
of A (a non-staring pirate); or you are a member of A that no other member of A 
stands in relation R to (an unstared-at pirate) . We have seen in s3 in ( 1 2) an 
example of a ( 1 9b) type exception. Actually the reverse situation and a type ( 1 9b) 
exception seems to be equally acceptable for this example (reverse the arrow going 
from pirate 6 to pirate 1 - the situation would still make ( 1 1 )  true) .  Once more, we 
will need to know more about exceptions in order to understand the difference 
between ( 1 1 )  and ( 1 6) .  
3. An Alternative 
It is now time to make precise this talk about exceptions .  Brisson ( 1 998) develops a 
theory of how certain individuals can be disregarded for the evaluation of a plural 
predication, and when this is possible . I introduce her theory in section 3 . 1 . , and 
apply it to relational plurals and reciprocals in sections 3 .2  and 3 . 3 .  respectively . 
Section 3 .4 .  is a speculation on how many exceptions we might be willing to 
tolerate. 
3.1. Brisson (1998) and Ill-fitting Covers 
The basic problem Brisson is interested in is illustrated by (20a) vs. (20b). 
(20) a. 
b .  
The children built a raft. 
The children all built a raft. 
(20a) has a collective and a distributive reading. Both are compatible with a child 
that is not involved in raft building. (20b) also has a collective and a distributive 
reading. However, both are incompatible with an uninvolved child. (20b) does not 
tolerate exceptions . I concentrate in my discussion on the distributive reading, for 
convenience. The standard representation of that reading is given in (2 1 ) . 
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(2 1 )  'v'x[x�C -> X built a raft] 
Let's assume as before that the default parts of the children-group are the individual 
children. (2 1 )  says that each of the children built a raft; the standard representation 
thus does not allow for uninvolved children. Why then are we prepared to tolerate 
them in (20a) but not in (20b)? To answer this question ,  Brisson builds on 
Schwarzschild's ( 1 996) theory of distributivity . The crucial ingredient of this 
revised theory of distribution is that distribution contains a pragmatic element, 
which determines what parts of a given group are relevant to distribution. The 
original motivation for this pragmatic element comes from data like (22a) vs. (22b) 
(from Schwarzschild ( 1 996)) .  
(22) a.  The cows and the pigs filled the bam to capacity . 
b .  The young animals and the old animals filled the barn to capacity . 
(22a) has a distributive reading that amounts to (23a) .  (22b) has a distributive 
reading that amounts to (23b) . 
(23) a .  
b .  
The cows filled the barn to capacity and the pigs filled the bam to 
capacity. 
The young animals filled the barn to capacity and the old animals 
filled the bam to capacity. 
Imagine now that the cows and the pigs are all the animals that there are in the 
context, and that's just the young animals and the old animals - i .e .  assume (24) . 
(24) [ [the cows and the pigs] ]  =[ [the young animals and the old animals]] 
=[ [the animals]] 
Then, under standard assumptions the distributive reading of both (22a) and (22b) 
should be as in (25) .  But then the interpretational difference between the two is 
quite mysterious .  
(25) 'v'x [ x � [ [the animals]] -> x filled the bam to capacity] 
The intuitive difference lies in what subgroups distribution is down to. It seems that 
those subgroups of the animals are relevant that are explicitly mentioned. 
Schwarzschild suggests that the context provides a division into subgroups -
formally : a cover. The notion of cover is defined as in (26) . 
(26) C is a cover of P iff 
C is a set of subsets of P 
Every member of P belongs to some set in C 
{ }  is not in C 
The proposal is that the context provides a cover of the universe of discourse . 
Distribution is sensitive to that cover. A better representation of the distributive 
reading of (22) is therefore (27) with a free variable Cov ranging over covers , 
which will be assigned a value according to context. The cover chosen contains the 
salient subgroups .  
EXCEPTIONS IN RELATIONAL PLURALS 
(27) 'Vx [ x  � [ [the animals]] & Cov(x) -> x filled the barn to capacity] 
(27) says that each salient subgroup of the animals filled the barn to capacity . What 
exactly this amounts to depends on what Cov is .  Let's assume that things that are 
explicitly mentioned are salient. The cover salient for (22a) would then be (28a) .  
With that value for Cov, (27) says that the cows filled the barn to capacity and so  
did the pigs . That is the desired interpretation (23a) .  In (22b) on  the other hand, 
mentioning the animals in terms of the young animals and the old animals makes 
salient the cover in (28b) . With that choice of cover, (27) amounts to (23b), the 
interpretation we intuitively get for (22b) . 
(28) a .  Cov[the animals] = { [ [the cows]] ,  [ [the pigs]] }  
b .  Cov[the animals] = { [ [the young animals]] ,  [ [the old animals]] } 
Equipped with this more sophisticated theory of distribution, let's go back to 
Brisson's example and the exceptions . A more adequate representation of (20a,b) 
repeated as (29a,b) is (29c) with the added restriction that the parts of the children 
group be members of the cover. (29c) says that those subparts of the children that 
are members of the cover built a raft. 
(29) a .  
b .  
c .  
The children built a raft. 
The children all built a raft. 
'Vx[x�C & Cov(x) -> x built a raft] 
How does the cover help us with the problem of (20a) vs . (20b)? Since this does 
not seem to be a problem with subgroups,  let's ignore subgroups and assume once 
more that distribution is to individual children (this is what Schwarzschild suggests 
as the default if we have no reason to believe that any interesting subgroups are 
relevant; we have assumed this so far and will continue to do so) . We made an 
important assumption in our discussion of the examples above, namely that the 
cover exhausts the groups distributed over; or in other words, that the cover of the 
universe of discourse is also a cover of the group we are looking at. In our 
particular example the covers were chosen in such a way that all animals got cought 
in the distribution by being part of an animal group that is a cell in the cover. Let's 
make this assumption explicit. For any plurality Y, we want to talk about the 
covered part of Y as defined in (30) . 
(30) Cov[Y] := {X:  XeCov & X�Y } 
The covered part of Y is the collection of all those cells in the cover that consist 
exclusively of members of Y. Looking at the representation of the distributive 
reading in (29c) , the covered part of C is that part of the children group that is 
quantified over. Imagine that the cover has the property in (3 1 a) :  if we form the 
union of all cells in the cover that consist of children only, we get back the original 
group. Then, each child will be affected by the universal quantification in (29c) , 
and all children without exception will be involved in raft building. This is what 
Brisson calls a good fit :  the cover is also a cover of the plurality under 
consideration. Imagine on the other hand that the covered part of the children is 
actually smaller than the original group. Whatever is not included in the covered 
part of C will not be affected by the universal quantification in (29c) .  Those 
children will be exceptions permitted by (29c) : children not involved in raft 
building. This is what Brisson calls an ill-fitting cover. 
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(31) a. 
b. 
uCov[C] = C  
uCov[C] <C 
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no exceptions 
exceptions 
The semantic contribution of 'all' is that it forces the cover to be a good fit. This 
accounts for the contrast in (20). 
Brisson identifies several factors that affect tolerance of exceptions. One is 
group size : exceptions are easier to accept in large groups than in small. Another 
one is information about the structure of the group. It seems that the more you're 
told about a group, the less you're willing to disregard parts of it. In (32a) for 
example, in addition to the group being small, the group is specified by naming 
individual members. It is hard to accept the sentence as true if one of Joe and Stacey 
is not involved in raft building. Only a special context can achieve that (for 
example, a team credit kind of scenario); I refer the interested reader to Brisson 
(1998) for discussion. 
(32) a. 
b. 
Joe and Stacey built a raft. 
The three children built a raft. 
I suggest that counting group members as in (32b) has an effect similar to naming 
group members : it makes no sense to introduce the raft builders as 'the three 
children' if I then want to disregard part of that group in the evaluation of the plural 
predication. 
To sum up, we now have a partially pragmatic theory of distribution. The 
context contributes a cover of the universe of discourse, which serves two 
functions : it accounts for subgroup effects, and it provides a mechanism by which 
we can accept exceptions to a plural predication. 
3.2. Covers in Relational Plurals 
I propose to carry over this theory of exceptions to relational plurals. In particular, I 
suggest that cumulative readings are sensitive to covers as well. Since covers are 
the mechanism by which we get exceptions, we expect them to be tolerated in 
cumulative interpretations as well as distributive interpretations. 
The original motivation for covers are subgroup effects, and subgroup 
effects showing up in cumulative readings provide independent evidence that 
cumulation is sensitive to covers. Consider (33). 
(33) The female cows and the female goats outnumber the male cows and the 
male goats. 
A salient interpretation for this sentence is one in which it would be true, for 
example, in a situation in which the female cows outnumber the male cows and the 
female goats outnumber the male goats. This is a cumulative interpretation relative 
to subgroups. A representation is given in (34) and the probable cover of the 
animals in (35). 
EXCEPTIONS IN RELATIONAL PLURALS 
(34) 'v'x[x:S:[[the female cows and the female goats]] & Cov(x) -> 
3y[y:S:[[the male cows and the male goats]] & Cov(y) & outnumber(x,y)]] 
& 'v'y[y:S:[[the male cows and the male goats]] & Cov(y) -> 
3x[x:S:[[the female cows and the female goats]]&Cov(x)& outnumber(x,y)]] 
(35) Cov[the animals]={FC, FG, MC, MG} 
That is, each salient subgroup of the female animals outnumbers a salient subgroup 
of the male animals, and each salient subgroup of the male animals is outnumbered 
by a salient subgroup of the female animals. 
This means that we should revise the semantics of cumulation as in (9'). 
(9') is just like (9) except that there is an extra condition that the subparts of our two 
groups be elements of the cover. In other words, the subgroups introduced in the 
quantification are required to be salient subgroups. 
(9') cumulation: 
ARB iff 'v'x[x:S;A & Cov(x) -> 3y[y:S;B & Cov(y) & xRy] & 
'v'y[y:S;B & Cov(y) -> 3x[x:S:A & Cov(x) & xRy] 
Equipped with this revised theory of cumulation, let's reconsider the Scha sentence 
repeated below. 
(36) The squares contain the circles. 
The cumulative reading of this sentence is given in (37), which includes reference 
to the cover. 
(37) 'v'x[x:S:S & Cov(x) -> 3y[y:s:C & Cov(y) & x contains y] & 
'v'y[y:S:C & Cov(y) -> 3x[x:s:S & Cov(x) & x contains y] 
Imagine that the cover has the properties in (38). 
(38) uCov[S] < S uCov[C] = C 
So, while the cover is also a cover of the circles, it is ill-fitting with respect to the 
squares. This means that there is a square that is not affected by the quantification in 
(37). In other words, with a cover choice as described in (38), (37) will be 
compatible with a square that does not contain any of the circles. Such a square will 
be a permissible exception to a cumulative reading. 
The data in (7) (repeated below as (39)) are examples in which exceptions 
were not acceptable. These data can now be identified as naming and counting 
effects on a par with (32). 
(39) a. 
b. 
The green jar and the purple jar contain the Earl Grey and the Assam. 
The three triangles contain the four circles. 
And finally, the fact that (36) is hard to accept as true in situation s2 in (6) makes 
some intuitive sense now: we would have to allow quite a lot of exceptions to our 
basic cumulative interpretation. Plausibly this is dispreferred and would require a 
special context to be acceptable, and we have not provided such a context. 
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This theory of exceptions in cumulative readings makes some further 
predictions. Most importantly perhaps, we expect exceptions to be possible in both 
ways indicated in (10); that is, there can be a non-covered part to both the subject 
and the object group in a relational plural. This is implausible for the example we 
have been looking at. In general however this prediction is borne out. A pertinent 
example is given in (40a), which is once more taken from Scha (1984). 
(40) a. 
b. 
The sides of rectangle 1 cross the sides of rectangle 2. 
'v'x[xSSRl & Cov(x) -> 3y[ySSR2 & Cov(y) & x crosses y] & 
'v'y[ySSR2 & Cov(y) -> 3x[xSSRl & Cov(x) & x crosses y] 
Note first that a cumulative reading (in which each side of Rl crosses at least one 
side of R2 and vice versa) is the strongest possible interpretation of this sentence; in 
particular, a stronger reading like a doubly distributive interpretation (in which each 
side of Rl crosses every side of R2) is factually impossible. Let's therefore assume 
the cumulative interpretation given in (40b) as the basic reading of this sentence. 
Now, Scha observes that (40a) is judged true in the situation given in (41). 
(41) 
Rl 
� __________ � R2 
This is what we would expect, given our claim that the cumulative reading of the 
sentence looks as in (40b). The cover variables contained in (40b) will allow for 
exceptions should the context support it. (42) shows what would count as an 
exception to (40): a side of Rl that does not cross any side of R2, or a side of R2 
not crossed by any side of Rl. 
(42) a. 3x[xSSRl & -3y[ySSR2 & x crosses y]] 
b. 3y[ySSR2 & -3x[xSSRl & x crosses y]] 
(40) permits both kinds of exceptions. I should note at this point that Scha's 
analysis of this example is not in terms of exceptions of course. He suggests the 
truth conditions given in (43), which are derived from the lexical meaning of cross 
as it holds between two pluralities. 
(43) 3x[xSSRl & 3y[ySSR2 & x crosses y]] 
My criticism of (5) as a general pattern for the truth conditions of a relational plural 
generalizes to (43). 
I would like to include the non-geometric example in (44a) in the 
discussion, which makes the same point but which I find a bit easier to judge. 
(44) a. 
b. 
EXCEPTIONS IN RELATIONAL PLURALS 
The forwards are faster than the defenders. 
'v'x[x� & Cov(x) -> 3y[y�D & Cov(y) & x is faster than y] & 
'v'y[y�D & Cov(y) -> 3x[x� & Cov(x) & x is faster than y] 
Since we are, once more, interested in exceptions to a cumulative reading (and not 
for example to a stronger distributive reading), let's first make sure that we envision 
a cumulative interpretation for the example. The background I have in mind is 
soccer, although depending on the reader's cultural background and athletic 
preferences other team sports might work as well. The point is that among the 
several forwards and several defenders, most are unlikely to come up against each 
other. The sentence is very plausibly taken to make a weaker claim than a doubly 
distributive reading (where every forward would have to be faster than every 
defender). Let's focus on the cumulative reading then, which according to our 
claims should look as in (44b). The cover variables contained in (44b) will allow 
for exceptions should the context support it. (45) shows what would count as an 
exception to (44) : a forward who is not faster than any defender, and a defender 
that is not slower than any forward. A (45a) type exception would be a slow center 
forward who we know is not expected to run, just score when the ball gets to 
herlhim. A (45b) type exception would be a fast sweeper, who we know is not the 
direct opponent of any forward, but will take care of critical situations that arise 
when another defender is passed by her/his opponent. Both are possible 
exceptions. 
(45) a. 
b. 
3x[x� & -3y[y�D & x is faster than y]] 
3y[y� & -3x[x� & x is faster than y]] 
Interestingly, Brisson's analysis of all combined with this theory of cumulation 
leads us to expect that all is compatible with a cumulative interpretation. This is 
correct - an example is given in (46a). (46a) is chosen to make exceptions to the 
cumulative interpretation very implausible. Actually our predictions are a bit more 
specific : 'all' enforces that the cover be a good fit for the NP that 'all' is associated 
with. Thus we expect that (46b) is compatible with the fast sweeper but not with the 
slow center forward, and the reverse for (46c). Again, the predictions are borne 
out. 
(46) a. 
b. 
c.  
The three forwards are all faster than the three defenders. 
The forwards are all faster than the defenders. 
The forwards are faster than all the defenders. 
In (47) below I provide data with the Scha example that are analogous to the data in 
(46). (47a), while permitting a cumulative interpretation, is intolerant to exceptions, 
as predicted. (47b) excludes an uncrossed side of RI, but might still permit an 
uncrossed side of R2, and the reverse for (47c). Sample situations for (47a-c) are 
given in (48a-c). 
(47) a. 
b. 
c. 
The four sides of RI cross all four sides of R2. 
The sides of RI all cross the sides of R2. 
The sides of RI cross all the sides of R2. 
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(48) a. 
b. 
c. 
3.3. WR and Ill-fitting Covers 
In this section I extend the proposal about the role of exceptions to the reciprocal 
data. This essentially means that weakly reciprocal interpretations must be sensitive 
to covers, too. (49) below provides independent motiviation for this in terms of 
subgroup effects in weak reciprocity. 
(49) The syntacticians of the two departments and the semanticists of the two 
departments meet with each other. 
Let's concentrate on group meetings. The sentence makes salient four subgroups of 
the linguists, the ones in (51). It would then be made true by various scenarios of 
meetings between those groups, for example the syntacticians of department 1 
meeting with the syntacticians of department 2, and the same for the semanticists. 
The weakly reciprocal interpretation for subgroups that is a salient interpretation for 
this sentence is given in (50) (I use L 'the linguists' to stand for the referent of 'the 
syntacticians of the two departments and the semanticists of the two departments'). 
EXCEPTIONS IN RELATIONAL PLURALS 
(50) V'x[xg. & Cov(x) -> 3y[y�L & Cov(y) & x"*y & x meet with y]] & 
V'y[yg. & Cov(y) -> 3x[xg. & Cov(x) & x"*y & x meet with y]] 
(51) Cov[the linguists]= {SernD 1 , SernD2, SynD1, SynD2} 
Thus the weakly reciprocal reading (50) says that each salient subgroup of the 
linguists meets with some other salient subgroup of the linguists. This means that 
we ought to revise the semantics of weak reciprocity as shown in (18'). (18') is just 
like (18) except that the subgroups of the group A are required to be elements of the 
cover. 
(18') Weak Reciprocity: 
A R each other iff 
V'x[x�A & Cov(x) -> 3y[y� & Cov(y) & x"*y & xRy]] & 
V'y[y�A & Cov(y) -> 3x[x�A & Cov(x) & x"*y & xRy]] 
Let's reconsider the pirate example repeated below in the light of these revisions. 
(52) The pirates stared at each other. 
According to what we just said, the correct representation of the weakly reciprocal 
reading of (52) is (53) with the cover variables. 
(53) V'x[x�P & Cov(x) -> 3y[y�P & Cov(y) & x"*y & x stared at y]] & 
V'y[y�P & Cov(y) -> 3x[x� & Cov(x) & x"*y & x stared at y]] 
Imagine that the cover has the property in (54) - e.g. it does not contain pirate 6. 
That pirate will not be affected by the quantification over group members in (53), 
i.e. will be an exception permitted by (53). In other words, pirate 6 is not required 
to be stared at by any other pirate. The sentence can thus be true in situation s3 in 
(12). 
(54) uCov[P] < P 
Actually, if pirate 6 is not covered, then he will be disregarded not only as a stared­
at individual but also as a starer. The two ways in which one can be an exception to 
a weakly reciprocal interpretation are not distinguished by the story as we are telling 
it here. The sentence should be equally acceptable in a situation like s5 in (55) with 
a completely uninvolved pirate. This seems fine. 
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(55) s5 : 
1 'a.2 
6 • 
3 
5�4/ 
We expect the same naming and counting effects to show up in reciprocal data as in 
relational plurals. Example (16) repeated in (56a) is just such a case. And we expect 
the presence of 'all' to preclude exceptions : (56b) in contrast to (52) should be false 
in s5, and it is. 
(56) a. 
b. 
These three people want to marry each other. 
The pirates all stared at each other. 
Finally, looking back to situation s4 in (15), this seems to be another case in which 
too many pirates would count as exceptions, and again covers that are that ill-fitting 
seem dispreferred. 
3.4. The Fit of the Cover 
We saw that the cover is a cover of the universe of discourse, not necessarily a 
cover of the pluralities affected by plural predication. However, it seems that we 
still want to impose requirements on the cover as 'covering' those pluralities. At 
least, we will want to say (57): 
(57) uCov[y]nY:I: {} 
If no part of a plurality Y is a member of the cover, quantification will be 
completely vacuous. That seems illegal, so (57) is certainly a constraint that the 
cover has to obey. The data discussed above indicate that we will probably want to 
say a bit more though. It seems that a 'sufficent' part of the plurality we are looking 
at needs to be covered. This is not a new intuition. Consider (58a), an example 
from Roberts (1987). (58b) is the description of the situation she wants to evaluate 
(58a) against : the sentence is true in that situation. (59) is the representation of the 
intuitive interpretation she suggests for the example (Roberts credits unpublished 
work by Emmon Bach for this suggestion). 
(58) a. 
b. 
The leaves touched each other. 
The leaves are all on one tree. Most of them touch one or more other 
leaves. 
(59) ENOUGHlxE A [ ENOUGH2YZE A [x:l:y & x:l:z & xRy & zRx]] 
I assume that the vague quantifier ENOUGH has the interpretation in (60). 
EXCEPTIONS IN RELATIONAL PLURALS 
(60) [[ENOUGHx<l>]]g =1 iff card( {a : [[<I>]]g[alX]=I} »n 
(where n is what counts as sufficient in the context) 
I will not discuss the second ENOUGH in (59), but rather stick to the intuition 
behind the paraphrase in (58b) that sufficiently many leaves touch at least one other 
leaf. (59) can then be simplified to (61a). Compare (61a) to the weakly reciprocal 
interpretation represented in ( 61 b). 
(61) a. 
b. 
ENOUGHxeA 
"iIxe A 
[ 3yze A [X:;i:y & x:;i:z & xRy & zRx]] 
[ 3yze A [X:;i:y & x:;i:z & xRy & zRx]] 
It seems that the vague quantifier ENOUGH essentially limits the number of 
exceptions to (61b) (non-touching leaves) that are permitted. 
Regarding the use of a quantifier like ENOUGH, Schwarzschild (1996) 
argues convincingly that counting group members is not in general a good way to 
evaluate a reciprocal sentence. Consider his example (62). 
(62) The prisoners on the two sides of the room could see each other. 
The sentence has a prominent reading in which it is true just in case the prisoners on 
one side of the room can see the prisoners on the other side of the room and vice 
versa. Imagine an opaque barrier in the middle of the room. The sentence would be 
false. However, make one group of prisoners very large and the other very small. 
The resulting numbers will make a claim like (59) true, but intuitively, the sentence 
remains false. Schwarzschild concludes that the reciprocal relation see has to hold 
between the salient subgroups of the reciprocal antecedent, not a certain number of 
members of that group. 
For this and related reasons, I will not consider a theory of reciprocals in 
terms of ENOUGH. But I suggest that we may be able to recover the intuition 
behind ENOUGH as a constraint on the cover : the cover must cover a sufficient 
proportion of the group quantified over in our plural predication. Consider (63) as a 
constraint on the cover. 
(63) card(uCov[YD : card(Y) � n 
Suppose that n=l. Then (63) says that the covered part of Y must be as large as Y 
itself, i.e. that the cover is also a cover of Y. No exceptions will be permitted. This 
seems to be one default value for n. But we have seen that n need not always be 1, 
it may be smaller. I don't think we can fix the value for n once and for all; n will be 
what counts as enough in a given context and will vary from one context to another. 
I propose to adopt (63) as a vague constraint on the cover. 
4. Conclusion 
I suggest that relational plurals do not have Scha's weaker interpretation in addition 
to the standard cumulative one; nor do reciprocals have a one-way weakly 
reciprocal interpretation in addition to a weakly reciprocal one. Weaker readings 
than cumulative and weakly reciprocal ones are to be analyzed in terms of 
exceptions. Exceptions to a cumulative reading and a weakly reciprocal 
interpretation come about by an independent theory of covers. This theory avoids 
increasing the number of semantic readings we need to assume for plural sentences, 
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and it gives us some insight into why tolerance of exceptions varies with the 
context. The findings in this paper confirm the parallel between relational plurals 
and reciprocals and support a theoretical perspective that relates weak reciprocity to 
cumulation, as argued by Langendoen (1978) and Stemefeld (1998). 
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